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LIFE AFTER LIMBO:
STATELESS PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL




Mikhail came to the United States from Turkmenistan on a Soviet
passport when he was twenty-two. This was the final destination of a
long circuitous journey that began when his ethnically Armenian family
was forced to flee Azerbaijan, his country of birth, during the war
between Azerbaijan and Armenia. He initially sought refuge in Russia,
but faced strong anti-Armenian sentiments that kept him and his family
moving. He entered Turkmenistan easily at a time when it was part of
the Soviet Union, and traveled to the United States on a Soviet travel
document at his earliest opportunity to seek safe haven.
In the United States, Mikhail applied for asylum, but his application
was denied because the harm he suffered was not considered suffi-
ciently severe to merit such relief. He was ordered removed to Russia,
or Turkmenistan in the alternative. However, Mikhail’s Soviet travel
documents had expired and the independent countries of Russia and
Turkmenistan did not consider him a citizen, and therefore refused his
return. Mikhail was ultimately placed into detention while immigration
authorities carried out efforts to remove him to Azerbaijan and Arme-
nia. However, neither of those countries would take him—Azerbaijan,
because it considered him Armenian, and Armenia, because it did not.
Mikhail languished in detention without any clear solution to his
situation. He applied for travel documents from more than a dozen
countries, and was soon forced to recognize that there was no country
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in the world that considered him its national, and that none would ever
take him. He was stateless, unwanted and completely without the
protection of any nation. The immigration authorities were eventually
forced to admit that chances for his removal were so remote that he had
to be released.
Mikhail lived more than a decade on supervised release from
detention, surviving under varying levels of restriction placed on him
by the immigration officials charged with his supervision in Houston
and Los Angeles. Mikhail travelled to American Samoa on vacation in
2012, made a day trip to Western Samoa, and inadvertently executed
his removal order. He spent the next year of his life stranded in
American Samoa, living on the kindness of strangers and working
desperately to return to his life in the mainland United States. Mikhail’s
health suffered, as he toiled day-after-day sending messages around the
world in hopes that someone would take up his case. It was only
through tireless advocacy by Mikhail, the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, and a cadre of lawyers that it was possible to
convince U.S. immigration authorities to exercise their humanitarian
discretionary authority to permit his return to the U.S. mainland.
Mikhail returned to his stateless legal limbo, threatened again by
removal proceedings, detention, or worse.1
There are migrants in the United States who have no land to call home;
they are stateless and they exist in a precarious legal limbo within U.S.
borders. To be stateless is to have no nationality, which the U.S. Supreme
Court has called “a fate of ever increasing fear and distress” that is “deplored
by the international community of democracies.”2 Stateless persons are not
recognized as citizens by any country, and as such, their enjoyment of
fundamental human rights depends on the good faith of host countries, and
their basic human security and dignity are often subject to the whims of
immigration authorities.
Despite this intense level of vulnerability, U.S. immigration law does not
explicitly recognize statelessness, nor does it provide for humanitarian
protection to relieve stateless persons of their suffering. Rather, stateless
persons are treated like any other unauthorized migrants in the United States;
when they are ordered removed, they are mandatorily detained while immi-
gration officials undertake efforts to execute those orders. Such removal
1. This summary of Mikhail’s life is drawn from news reports that covered his story while he was
stranded in American Samoa, and after he returned. See Stateless And Stranded On American Samoa,
NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Oct. 7, 2012), available at http://www.npr.org/2012/10/07/162445840/stateless-
and-stranded-on-american-samoa; Moises Mendoza, Back from Samoa: Stateless Man Allowed Entry
into US, GLOBAL POST (Feb. 16, 2013), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/
united-states/130215/samoa-stateless-us.
2. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (holding that denationalization of U.S. citizens
who had abandoned their mandatory military service was cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by
the 8th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
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efforts are futile in the case of stateless persons, and when they are ultimately
released from detention, they are cast into a legal limbo in which they spend
the rest of their lives on immigration parole, uncertain as to what their future
may hold. This troubling gap in humanitarian protection has gone unad-
dressed in the United States for too long.
Notably, U.S. lawmakers have made great strides to codify international
humanitarian protections for certain at-risk migrants.3 In particular, over the
last thirty-five years, the United States has incorporated international refugee
law into U.S. immigration law, and created a process through which persons
who demonstrate a fear of persecution abroad because of some protected
characteristic may seek asylum in the United States.4 While an analogous
body of international law exists for the protection of stateless persons who
have no nationality under the operation of laws of any country, this body of
law has never been made part of the U.S. protection framework. While some
stateless persons are also refugees, and therefore may benefit from the U.S.
system of asylum protection, many are not. Therefore, stateless persons—
like Mikhail—are left stranded without protection under U.S. immigration
law.
An important development in this regard was a proposal by the U.S.
Senate to establish a mechanism for the protection of stateless persons under
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as part of its 2013 comprehensive
immigration reform bill, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and
Immigration Modernization Act (SB 744).5 This proposed incorporation of
statelessness protection into U.S. immigration law has been underreported,
and its potential as a humanitarian remedy that would mitigate bureaucratic
inefficiency has been underappreciated. The current ebb in the tide of reform
of the U.S. immigration system provides an important moment for reflection
about the recent proposal to address the problem of statelessness in the
United States.
This article argues that it is imperative to establish a protection mechanism
for stateless persons in the United States, but that the proposed mechanism
may fail to meaningfully address the statelessness problem if it is not tethered
to the international protection framework. This discussion is divided into
three sections.
The first section provides a brief overview of the historical roots for the
international protection regimes for refugees and stateless persons. It
describes the overlap between the two populations and the relationship
between the two governing legal regimes so as to highlight the importance of
utilizing the experience of refugee protection in the project to eradicate
3. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
4. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
5. See S. 744, 113th Cong. § 3405 (2013), available at https://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-
congress/senate-bill/744/text.
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statelessness. The section then goes on to explain how refugee law has been
incorporated into U.S. immigration law, while the law of statelessness has
not, and suggests that the U.S. experience with asylum law could be
instrumental in efforts to identify and protect stateless persons.
The second section describes how the failure of U.S. immigration law to
account for stateless persons has created a legal limbo that engulfs an
unknown number of stateless persons today. This section lays plain the
inefficiencies of a system that conducts removal operations against persons
who cannot practically be removed. The section further highlights the
inhumanity of conducting such operations against internationally protected
persons, and illustrates the human suffering that often results when they are
kept in mandatory immigration detention and then monitored on immigration
parole for the rest of their lives. Finally, this section explains how U.S.
asylum law is ill-suited to provide necessary protection for stateless persons,
and lends emphasis to the call for complementary protection under U.S.
immigration law for this population.
The third section of this article analyzes the proposed U.S. mechanism to
protect stateless persons under the standards of the international law of
statelessness. This analysis relies in part on an analogy to the U.S. experience
with asylum protection, highlighting those areas in which international
guidance has been crucial to establishing the proper scope of refugee
protection. The section follows the framework provided by recently issued
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) guidance on
statelessness protection and scrutinizes the definition of “stateless person” set
forth in SB 744, the legal status contemplated for this protected group, and
the determination procedures that must be implemented. This section demon-
strates how a failure to follow international standards could give way to
restrictive statutory interpretations and burdensome standards of proof and
evidence that could undermine the goal of the law.
The legal and factual complications inherent in making statelessness
determinations require both a contextualized understanding of the problem of
statelessness as well as analytical precision. International guidance on
statelessness protection provides both, and there are important reasons for the
United States to follow this guidance. First, the legal limbo to which stateless
persons are currently condemned in the United States perpetuates the
deleterious effects of human rights violations that stateless persons have
often suffered at the hands of foreign powers. Additionally, detaining
stateless persons as if they were removable, and conducting futile efforts to
deport them squanders the resources of an overburdened system of immigra-
tion regulation. In effect, the stateless legal limbo distracts U.S. immigration
authorities from their work to further the national security while they
inadvertently contribute to the dehumanization of an internationally pro-
tected people. The United States should promulgate a system of protection
354 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:351
for stateless persons, and it should harmonize that system with the guidance
provided by the international protection framework.
I. INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION AND THE UNITED STATES
International protection, particularly as it relates to stateless persons and
refugees, has been a feature of the global community’s efforts to provide
humanitarian relief for nearly a century.6 The international community
developed specific legal regimes to resettle refugees and stateless persons in
the wake of the Second World War, and as the dimensions of these problems
have evolved, so have the protection regimes themselves. Throughout this
process of evolution, the statelessness protection framework has been the
quiet sibling of the refugee protection regime. However, statelessness protec-
tion has more recently commanded international attention, after hundreds of
thousands of people were left stateless during the succession and reformation
of states in the post-Cold War era.7 It is primarily the plight of persons left
stateless by these large scale political shifts, and the accompanying legal
reforms, that has brought this issue to the attention of U.S. officials in a more
focused way.
Philosopher Hannah Arendt described the “calamity of the rightless” in
The Origins of Totalitarianism, her 1951 account of the process of dehuman-
ization that came to a crescendo in the atrocities of WWII.8 Of the stateless,
Arendt said: “Their plight is not that they are not equal before the law, but
that no law exists for them; not that they are oppressed, but that nobody wants
to oppress them. Only in the last stage of a rather lengthy process is their right
to live threatened.”9 Arendt suggested that the Nazi denationalization of the
Jewish people that resulted in their statelessness was a decisive step in the
effort to eliminate them from existence.10
At the same time that Arendt wrote of the intense vulnerabilities of
stateless persons, the United Nations (U.N.) convened a Conference of
Plenipotentiaries to complete the drafting and signature of a convention for
6. Soon after the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920, Fridtjof Nansen was named as
the High Commissioner for Refugees. See UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES 2000:
FIFTY YEARS OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION 15 (2000), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4a4c754a9.
html; 2006 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (discussing deliberation about conflicts between
nationalities at the 1930 Hague Conference).
7. INSTITUTE ON STATELESSNESS AND INCLUSION, THE WORLD’S STATELESS 96 (2014), available at
http://www.institutesi.org/worldsstateless.pdf (reporting that “Some 85% of stateless persons re-
ported in Europe can be found in just four countries (Latvia, the Russian Federation, Estonia and
Ukraine)—in all cases as an enduring product of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.”).
8. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 295-96 (1951).
9. Id.
10. Id. (“Even the Nazis started their extermination of the Jews by first depriving them of all legal
status (the status of second-class citizenship) and cutting them off from the world of the living by
herding them into ghettos and concentration camps, and before they set the gas chambers in motion
they had carefully tested and found to their satisfaction that no country would claim these people. The
point is that a condition of complete rightlessness was created before the right to live was
challenged.”).
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refugees with a protocol for stateless persons.11 In so doing, the U.N.
recognized the interconnectedness of these two vulnerable populations,
citing two main causes of statelessness: (1) flight from racial, religious, or
political persecution, and (2) mass emigration caused by changes in a
country’s political or social system.12 Despite the interconnectedness of the
stateless and refugee experiences, the Conference of Plenipotentiaries ulti-
mately drafted two separate, though very similar conventions: the 1951
Convention on the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) and the 1954
Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons (Statelessness Convention).13
These conventions set forth legal regimes that were intended primarily to
facilitate the settlement of refugees and stateless persons who had no country
to which they could reasonably return after WWII. The Refugee Convention
provided a framework for the resettlement of persons with a well-founded
fear of persecution in their country of nationality or former habitual resi-
dence, where that persecution would be on account of race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.14
The Statelessness Convention provided analogous protection to persons not
considered nationals under the operation of law of any country.15
For those who meet the 1954 Convention definition of statelessness, the
Convention provides four bundles of guarantees: (i) juridical status, includ-
ing personal status, property rights, right of association, and access to
courts; (ii) gainful employment, including wage-earning employment, self-
employment, and access to the “liberal professions”; (iii) welfare, including
rationing, housing, public education, public relief, labor legislation, and
social security; and (iv) administrative measures, including administrative
assistance, freedom of movement, identity papers, travel documents, fiscal
changes, transfer of assets, expulsion, and naturalization.16 These guarantees
track those provided by the Refugee Convention, evidencing the goal of
providing seamless protection to stateless persons and refugees.17
11. Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, Status of Refugees and Stateless
Persons—Memorandum by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/2 (Jan. 3, 1950).
12. E.S.C. Res. 1949/248 (IX) B, U.N. Doc. A/RES/972 (IV) (Aug. 8, 1949) at 131, 141-42.
13. U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee
on Statelessness and Related Persons, U.N. Doc. E/1618; E/AC.35/5 (Feb. 17 1950), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/40aa15374.html; UNHCR, UNHCR HANDBOOK ON THE DETER-
MINATION OF STATELESSNESS (2010).
14. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1.A, July 28, 1951, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
15. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons art. 1.1, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S.
117, available at http://www.unhcr.org/3bbb25729.html [hereinafter Statelessness Convention].
16. See id. at art. 12-32; UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROTECTION OF STATELESS PERSONS ¶ 129 (2014)
[hereinafter Statelessness Handbook]. Notably, the Statelessness Convention does not contain any
protection against refoulement or penalties for illegal entry, and it provides lower standards of
treatment with respect to employment and freedom of association than the Refugee Convention. Id. at
¶ 127.
17. Carol A. Batchelor, Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status, 10 INT’L J.
REFUGEE L. 172 (1998).
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While the refugee and statelessness protection frameworks were born of
similar concerns and track each other closely in the guarantees they provide,
the international community has received them in very different manners
since they were opened for ratification. The Refugee Convention was
initially limited both temporally and geographically in its scope,18 but was
followed by a 1967 Protocol, which eliminated those limitations.19 Since that
time, a virtual consensus has formed among the international community
with regard to the importance of ensuring international protection for
refugees, reflected in the fact that 145 states are parties to the Refugee
Convention.20 Moreover, many states have taken seriously these obligations
and enacted them in the form of national legislation to provide asylum to
refugees.21
Where the international protection regime for refugees has seen tremen-
dous success over the last sixty years, the parallel regime for the protection of
stateless persons has languished. Indeed, it is only somewhat recently that
stateless persons have once again made their way into the humanitarian
agenda of the international community. Specifically, with the fall of the
Soviet Union followed closely by the dissolution of the Former Yugoslavia,
the global community was forced to recognize the persistent humanitarian
needs of stateless persons. These turbulent shifts from large socialist repub-
lics to substantial numbers of independent successor states were accompa-
nied by efforts to consolidate national identities. One manner in which this
identity formation was carried out was through the drafting of nationality
laws that defined who would become a citizen of the newly independent
nations. Persons were excluded from these new nationalities for a variety of
reasons, and many of them became stateless.22 This increased visibility of
stateless persons and their struggle led to a renewed recognition of the
importance of the international regime for the protection of stateless persons.
The UNHCR currently estimates that there are at least ten million stateless
persons in the world today.23 While this is not as substantial as nearly 17
million refugees,24 the magnitude of this problem certainly calls for a
18. Refugee Convention, supra note 14, at art. 1.B.
19. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
20. See Refugee Convention, supra note 14.
21. See Law No. 26.165, Nov. 8, 2006, B.O. 1 (Arg.), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/
46d559e92.html; Asylgesetz 2005 [2005 Asylum Act] Federal Law Gazette [FGL] No. 100/2005
(Austria), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/46adc62c2.html; Act No. 493/1999, May 1,
1999 (Fin.), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b59510.html; Legge 30 luglio 2002,
n.189 (It.), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3fd9cd6d4.html.
22. See Kuric and Others v. Slovenia (No. 26828/06), Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010) (finding human rights
violations against persons who were left stateless after the dissolution of the Yugoslavia who later had
their records removed from the population register, leading to their loss of residence), available at
http://www.statelessness.eu/sites/www.statelessness.eu/files/attachments/resources/ECHR_GC_
Kuric%20v%20Slovenia_June2012.pdf.
23. See INSTITUTE FOR STATELESSNESS & INCLUSION, supra note 7, at 55.
24. See Facts and Figures about Refugees, UNHCR, available at http://www.unhcr.org.uk/about-
us/key-facts-and-figures.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2016).
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similarly vigorous protection effort. Nevertheless, by the end of 2014, only
eighty-four countries had ratified the Statelessness Convention.25 While this
indicates less concern for the stateless population on the international level,
roughly a quarter of those ratifications have occurred in the previous five
years, which serves as evidence of increasing concern.26 A dozen countries,
including France, Spain, Italy, Hungary, the United Kingdom, Mexico and
the Philippines, have established national mechanisms for the protection of
stateless persons.27 The UNHCR has recently initiated a ten-year campaign
to end statelessness, which may build on current momentum to identify and
protect this vulnerable population.28
Recent efforts by some legislators in the United States to provide protec-
tion to stateless persons should be understood in the context of these global
trends in international protection.
The United States did not sign the Refugee Convention or the Stateless-
ness Convention in the post-war era. However, as part of the global
recognition of the persistent need for refugee protection, the United States
did sign the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention. In so doing, the
United States took on the international obligation to protect persons fleeing
persecution, without the temporal or geographic limitations of the Refugee
Convention.29 The U.S. Congress later implemented these international
obligations in the form of the 1980 Refugee Act, which established the
regime for asylum under U.S. law.30 In ratifying the international obligations
of the Refugee Convention and establishing a national protection mechanism
for asylum seekers, the United States joined a global community that
recognized the need to address the needs of refugees on a global scale.
While the United States has been paying increasing attention to the global
problem of statelessness, there is no indication that it intends to ratify the
Statelessness Convention. The United States participated in the Ministerial
and Intergovernmental Event on Refugees and Stateless Persons at the
United Nations in December 2011 to commemorate the anniversaries of the
1951 Refugee Convention and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness.31 At that meeting, sixty-one countries made a variety of
25. See Statelessness Convention, supra note 15.
26. See Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?srcTREATY&mtdsg_noV-3&chapter5&Temp
mtdsg2&langen (last visited Jan. 22, 2016).
27. See EUROPEAN NETWORK ON STATELESSNESS, STATELESSNESS DETERMINATION AND THE PROTEC-
TION STATUS OF STATELESS PERSONS 7 (2013), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/53162a2f4.
html.
28. UNHCR Launches 10-year Global Campaign to End Statelessness, UNHCR (Nov. 4, 2014),
http://www.unhcr.org/545797f06.html.
29. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31 1967, available at http://www.refworld.
org/docid/3ae6b3ae4.html.
30. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
31. See State Action on Statelessness, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4ff2bdff6.html (last
visisted Jan. 21, 2016).
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pledges to promote and protect the rights of stateless persons around the
world.32 U.S. officials participated in that meeting, and made a series of very
important pledges, one of which was to “[a]ctively work with Congress to
introduce legislation that provides a mechanism for stateless persons in the
United States to obtain permanent residency and eventually citizenship.”33
While some countries used this meeting as an opportunity to manifest their
intention to ratify or accede to either the 1954 or the 1961 Statelessness
Conventions, the United States made no such pledge.
It is unclear why the possibility of ratifying the Statelessness Convention
has never been the subject of serious debate in the United States. Perhaps it is
because the U.S. stateless population only numbers in the thousands—a tiny
fraction of the global stateless population,34 and it is not a domestic problem
substantial enough to justify the political investment required for the debate
and ratification of an international convention.
Regardless, the U.S. pledge to work with Congress to introduce legislation
on statelessness protection represents an important step forward on this
discrete, though pressing issue. Indeed, the movement for comprehensive
reform of the U.S. immigration system may provide the most viable political
alternative for advancing statelessness protection in the United States. If this
is the case, then the SB 744 proposal for a national protection mechanism
could be the most effective model for eliminating the stateless legal limbo. In
order to better understand the scope and nature of the problem of stateless-
ness in the United States, the following section explores this phenomenon as
a matter of law and fact.
II. THE LEGAL LIMBO OF STATELESS PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES
Statelessness is not a legal condition specifically recognized under U.S.
law. It naturally follows from the fact that U.S. law fails to identify stateless
persons, that their protection needs are not specifically addressed. This gap in
humanitarian protection has the simultaneous effect of unnecessarily taxing
the U.S. system of immigration regulation, which is built in part on the
understanding that persons without permission to reside in the United States
can be removed. Removal operations for people who are not welcome
anywhere in the world consume scarce immigration court resources, deten-
tion beds, and precious time from detention and removal officers. This futile
administrative expenditure only acts to compound the effects of substantial
32. Id.
33. See UNHCR, PLEDGES 2011: MINISTERIAL GOVERNMENTAL EVENT ON REFUGEES AND STATE-
LESS PERSONS (2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/commemorations/Pledges2011-preview-
compilation-analysis.pdf.
34. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-091, at 123 (2012) (congressional record for the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Bill).
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human rights violations that have left stateless people homeless and adrift in
the world.
A. U.S. Immigration Law Fails to Account for Stateless Persons
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) has never provided a defini-
tion of “stateless person” under U.S. law or guidance on how statelessness
should be determined.35 Because there is no legal framework for the
recognition or protection of stateless persons, they are rarely identified as
such until they come to the attention of U.S. immigration authorities. Most
commonly, the significance of a person’s statelessness will become most
evident when he or she is placed in removal proceedings. At that moment, the
effects of having no home, nowhere to return to, and no state to speak up for
that individual become apparent.
The lack of legal definition or determination process in the United States
means both that some nationals can be mistakenly deemed stateless by
immigration authorities and that stateless persons can be determined to be
foreign nationals in error. According to data collected from U.S. immigration
authorities by Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at
Syracuse University between 1994 and 2014, deportation proceedings were
initiated against individuals who were either stateless or unable to provide a
nationality in 2,126 cases.36 This means that Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) identified approximately one hundred stateless persons a
year over a twenty-year span, and initiated deportation proceedings against
them. While it is not possible to use this data to identify stateless persons who
were miscounted as nationals of some country, the inclusion of categories for
“Unknown Nationality” and “Soviet Union,” which did not actually exist
during the relevant twenty-year period, confirm some lack of clarity around
who is stateless.
When removal proceedings are initiated against stateless persons, even
when they are identified as such at the outset, there is no specific provision
that applies to them. Indeed, the U.S. system of immigration enforcement
35. Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter Act), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 182 Stat.
66 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1-1778 (2012)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1351 (2012) (showing the only
mention of the term “stateless” in the entire Immigration and Nationality Act under the title
authorizing the Secretary of State to set non-immigrant visa fees). While the INA does acknowledge
in some provisions relating to humanitarian relief that immigrants may have “no nationality,” this
distinction is mainly intended to cover potential gaps in application of those provisions, as opposed to
signal an interest in providing protection to this population. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (2012); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1158 (2012). At the same time, the “no nationality” formulation is only included in some
provisions for humanitarian immigration relief; namely, the provisions that govern temporary
protected status (TPS), see 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a), and asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158. Interestingly, the
regulations developed by the U.S. Department of Justice at 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 to provide guidance to
its officers in exercising their statutory mandate replace the “no nationality” formulation with the
term “stateless.”
36. See U.S. Deportation Proceedings in Immigration Courts, TRAC IMMIGR., http://trac.syr.edu/
phptools/immigration/charges/deport_filing_charge.php (last visited Jan. 21, 2016).
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rests on some fundamental assumptions, one of which is that someone who
does not have authorization to reside in the United States may be sent to
another country. This assumption does not bear out in reality in the case of
stateless persons, who are not nationals of any country, and no country in the
world is obliged to issue them documents to facilitate their return. The legal
limbo that engulfs stateless persons arises from this very disconnect between
the letter and spirit of immigration law, which require an individual’s
removal, and the reality that there is no way to effectuate that removal as a
practical matter.
Whether an individual is regarded as stateless, or mislabeled as a national
of a country that no longer exists or fails to recognize that individual, the
proceedings will initiate in a manner identical to any other removal proceed-
ings: with the designation of a country for removal. Immigration judges
follow a statutory framework in designating the country for removal, and the
U.S. Supreme Court has summarized that framework as a four-step process:
(1) An alien shall be removed to the country of his choice, unless one of
the conditions eliminating that command is satisfied; (2) otherwise he
shall be removed to the country of which he is a citizen, unless one of
the conditions eliminating that command is satisfied; (3) otherwise he
shall be removed to one of the countries with which he has a lesser
connection; or (4) if that is impracticable, inadvisable or impossible, he
shall be removed to another country whose government will accept the
alien into that country.37
This fairly routine matter raises very complicated issues for stateless
persons, who have no citizenship and therefore no way to seek diplomatic
protection from any country. First, a person can only choose a country for
removal that will issue travel documents to him or her.38 A stateless person
will be unable to reasonably identify such a country. The second step is
similarly not available to a stateless person, who is by definition not a citizen
of any country. The third step is likely the step in which a stateless person will
be assigned a country for removal.39 However, in the case of a stateless
person it is unlikely that the “lesser” connection required to designate a
country for removal will be sufficient to ultimately secure travel documents
from that country.40 Indeed, stateless persons are not likely ever to be
37. Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005) (summarizing the
instructions codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) (2012).
38. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(C).
39. At least one court has required immigration authorities to address the issue of nationality in
the case of a stateless person before moving on to the third inquiry, and ordering the person removed
to a country “with which he has a lesser connection.” See Hadera v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 1154, 1157
(9th Cir. 2007) (finding error in an immigration judge’s decision under the second inquiry to
“designate Ethiopia for whatever it may be worth,” regardless of whether the respondent was “a
subject, national, or citizen”).
40. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(C) (2012).
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removed by virtue of the fact that they have no unfettered right to enter any
state in the world.
The U.S. Supreme Court has been faced with the quandary of the
unenforceable removal order in the case of Keyse Jama, a native and citizen
of Somalia who argued that Somalia would never issue him travel documents
because it did not have a functioning government.41 The Supreme Court held
that the statute outlined above did not explicitly require that the target
country consent to removal,42 and because it was such a high profile case,
immigration authorities promptly flew Jama to a region of Somalia known as
Puntland on a private jet and hired private escorts to take him through the
airport.43 However, because Jama did not have a travel document, he was
denied entry into the country and returned to the United States—a failed
operation that reportedly cost taxpayers two hundred thousand dollars.44
While Jama was not stateless as a legal matter, the futility of his removal
order at the time that it was issued is analogous to the case of stateless
persons.
Fortunately, the U.S. government does not spend hundreds of thousands of
dollars on failed efforts to remove all stateless persons. However, because
there is no legal process for ICE to recognize whether its statutorily
mandated removal efforts will be futile in the case of stateless persons, these
individuals may suffer inordinate periods of detention while pleading in vain
for countries to take them. When they ultimately secure their release from
detention, they face an uncertain life on immigration parole with clear
impediments to ever settling in the United States.
B. Stateless Persons Move from Arbitrary Detention to a Life on
Immigration Parole
Whether an individual has been designated as stateless by the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), or mistakenly deemed a national of a country
that does not recognize him or her as a citizen, a removal order will trigger an
established process of detention and removal. It is at this stage that the
administrative inefficiency of the U.S. immigration system, caused by its
failure to recognize statelessness, and the inhumanity of the stateless legal
limbo become most evident.
Persons ordered removed from the United States are mandatorily detained
under statute in order to facilitate the execution of the removal order, an
41. Jama, 543 U.S. at 337-38.
42. Id. at 341-51.
43. Elizabeth Stawicki, U.S. Immigration Spent $200K on Keyse Jama Deportation, MINNESOTA
PUBLIC RADIO (June 23, 2006), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2006/06/23/jamaflight/
(indicating that the efforts to remove Jama cost upwards of $200,000).
44. Id. (reporting that after six months of checking in with ICE twice a week, Jama fled to Canada
to seek asylum).
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action DHS should complete within a ninety-day “removal period.”45 Even if
it has been established in the removal proceedings that an individual is
stateless, and a country for removal has been assigned as a matter of course
and without a real expectation that the person will be removed, detention
necessarily follows. Moreover, persons can be detained beyond the removal
period, and such post-removal period detention is a matter of course for
certain “inadmissible or criminal aliens.”46
Fortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court has placed a limit on the amount of
time that ICE can hold an individual in post-removal order detention. In
Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court held that the INA authorized immigration
authorities to detain resident non-citizens beyond the removal period because
of criminal convictions, only as long as “reasonably necessary” to remove
them from the country.47 Significantly, three years after deciding Zadvydas,
the Supreme Court extended the same reasoning to the case of inadmissible
non-citizens who challenged their detention beyond the removal period in
Clark v. Martinez.48 The effect of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Zadvydas
and Clark was to guarantee, under the law, that all non-citizens have the right
to release after six months of being deemed removable if there is “no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”49
This rule was subsequently incorporated into DHS operations through the
“Zadvydas regulations.”50
These regulations are often interpreted by ICE to require some period of
post-removal order detention, even if that person is clearly stateless and has
no reasonable likelihood of ever being removed to another country. This
detention can last ninety days to six months under the regulations without
any justification. Moreover, even after six months, when the Zadvydas
regulations require release if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, many
have observed weaknesses in this regime’s implementation.51 For example,
the DHS Office of the Inspector General has concluded that the likelihood of
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2001); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2001) (substituting the Secretary
of Homeland Security for the Attorney General).
46. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) (2012) (providing specifically that the alien
may be detained beyond the presumptively reasonable period, if the alien is found removable under 8
U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4)).
47. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689, 699 (2001).
48. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005) (noting that the removal of two men could not be
effectuated and both were detained beyond the removal period because the United States did not have
diplomatic relations with Cuba).
49. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
50. The regulations provide the procedures to determine: (1) whether an individual detainee will
be detained or released following the ninety-day removal period, 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 (2011); (2) whether
there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future after 180 days in
detention, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 (2011); and (3) whether detention can be continued on account of
‘special circumstances’ beyond 180 days, even where removal is not foreseeable, 8 C.F.R. § 241.14
(2011).
51. See KATHLEEN GLYNN & SARAH BRONSTEIN, SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS PERSIST IN U.S. ICE
CUSTODY REVIEWS FOR “INDEFINITE” DETAINEES (Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. 2005),
available at http://idcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/clinicindefinitereportfinal.pdf.
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removal standard is not sufficiently documented and transparent.52 There is
little question that stateless persons are particularly vulnerable in the deten-
tion context considering their vulnerability as unclaimed persons who are
often far from anyone who is in a position to shed light on their case.
The case of Artour Minasian, a former stateless detainee, reveals the
weaknesses in the current system of custody review.53 Artour was born in
Georgia and is of Armenian descent. He came to the United States on a Soviet
passport in 1992 to apply for asylum because the Georgian authorities were
persecuting and expelling everyone in the country who was not Georgian,
and he was a target because of his Armenian ethnicity. Artour was denied
asylum and transferred into mandatory post-removal order detention.
After two months in detention, Artour was asked to reach out to Armenia
for travel documents, but was denied. Nevertheless, after six months, he
received a letter stating that his removal to the Republic of Georgia was
foreseeable and that his detention would continue. After nine months, a
Georgian consular official indicated that travel documents would not likely
be issued. Nevertheless, he received another notice after eleven months that
his removal was foreseeable and his detention would therefore be continued.
Artour continued in detention until a pro bono lawyer filed a petition for
habeas corpus on his behalf, and he was released a week later, after 14
months, without the petition even being adjudicated.
Artour’s case provides anecdotal evidence that the regulatory framework
is imperfect, and that stateless persons are particularly vulnerable to its
imperfection. However, as oppressive as extended periods of detention may
be, release from detention does not always bring peace to stateless persons in
the United States, who continue without status or recourse within U.S.
borders, never really able to integrate or regularize their situation.
The Zadvydas regulations provide the framework for supervised release of
those persons with a final order of removal but for whom removal is not
reasonably foreseeable. The regulations provide that an order of supervision
will govern the terms of release, and that it will include conditions that the
individual: (1) appear before an immigration officer periodically for identifi-
cation; (2) submit, if necessary, to a medical and psychiatric examination; (3)
give information under oath about his nationality, circumstances, habits,
associations, activities, and any other information requested by the authori-
52. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, OIG07-28 , ICE’S
COMPLIANCE WITH DETENTION LIMITS FOR ALIENS WITH A FINAL ORDER OF REMOVAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES 31 (2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_07-28_Feb07.pdf (re-
porting that while the Zadvydas regulations include a list of factors to consider when determining
whether removal is reasonably foreseeable, they do not provide guidance on how to incorporate the
Supreme Court’s requirement that custody determinations receive greater scrutiny over time).
53. DAVID BALUARTE, FROM MARIEL CUBANS TO GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: STATELESS PERSONS
DETAINED UNDER U.S. AUTHORITY 27 (Equal Rights Trust 2010), available at http://www.
equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank//Statelessness_in_USA_17_Jan.pdf (the full interview with
Artur Minasian is on file with the author).
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ties; (4) obey all applicable laws, and other reasonable written restrictions on
conduct or activities; (5) continue to seek travel documents, assist authorities
in obtaining such documents, and provide the authorities with all correspon-
dence with relevant Embassies seeking the issuance of travel documents; (6)
obtain advance approval of travel beyond previously specified times and
distances; and (7) provide notice of change of address.54
Stateless individuals released under this regime with no cognizable end
date have unsuccessfully challenged such conditions under a variety of
constitutional theories.55 Without a framework for their protection in the
United States, most stateless persons are forced to remain in this condition of
perpetual legal limbo, unable to leave the United States, but also unable to
escape the stigma of living under a removal order and needing to justify their
presence to ICE detention and removal authorities in regular intervals.
Tatianna Lesnikova has spoken publicly about the challenges faced by
stateless persons condemned to a life of supervised release.56 Tatianna fled to
the United States from the Ukraine when it was under Soviet rule to save her
son, who was being threatened because of politically controversial state-
ments he had made in school.57 Tatianna left her older son in the Soviet
Union, thinking that once she had brought her younger son, David, to safety,
she would be able to send for his older brother. Their claim for asylum was
denied, and the two of them were whisked away to detention in shackles.58
Efforts to remove them failed because Ukraine would not recognize them as
citizens, and Tatianna has now lived in the United States under a regime of
supervision for approximately twenty years.
The psychological impacts of this are clear in both David and his mother.
Tatianna speaks about David’s hesitation to marry because of his fear that he
could be torn away from his family. For David the regular reporting to ICE
reminded him of how vulnerable he and his mother were and that they could
be detained at any time just as they had been the day their asylum
applications were denied. Moreover, Tatianna cannot leave the United States,
which means that she has not seen her oldest son since she originally escaped
the Soviet Union. She struggles daily with the reality that she may never see
her son, and that her act of bravery to save her child from harm may have
permanently torn her family apart.
54. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h) (2011) (incorporating INA § 241(a)(3) and 8 CFR § 241.5 by
reference).
55. See Berry v. Adducci, No. 10-10969, 2010 WL 2105130 (E.D. Mich. May 25, 2010);
Abusheikh v. Attorney General of United States, 225 F. App’x 56 (3rd Cir. 2007).
56. See Tatianna Lesnikova, Stateless Person Residing in the U.S., Address at the Washington
Peace Center Conference on Statelessness (Oct. 30, 2009) (speaking on a panel along with experts in
the field); Shamander Dulai & Moises Mendoza, Stateless: The Ultimate Legal Limbo, NEWSWEEK
(Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/stateless-ultimate-legal-limbo-319461.
57. Interview with Tatianna Lesnikova, in Washington, D.C. (June 21, 2011).
58. Neel Arora, Stateless in America, A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE (July 11, 2010), https://neelarora.
wordpress.com/2010/07/11/stateless-in-america/.
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The inefficiency of this system of protracted removal proceedings, post-
removal order detention, and perpetual immigration parole compound the
problem of the stateless legal limbo. The cost of detaining one individual in
immigration detention has been estimated to be anywhere between $122 and
$164 per day.59 It is difficult to calculate the cost of the time spent by
detention and removal officers on follow-up with countries that will not
claim would-be stateless deportees from the United States, but there is little
question that the time is wasted. While the failed attempt to actually remove
Keyse Jama that cost taxpayers an estimated two hundred thousand dollars is
not common, the potential for such waste is clearly in evidence.
Similarly, the monitoring of these individuals in perpetuity once they are
released is both unnecessary and a waste of scarce immigration resources.
The efficiency concerns speak nothing of the opportunity cost of keeping
otherwise productive individuals in a constant state of instability and eco-
nomic precariousness, in which they must compete on the job market with
the stigma of being removable and apply for a temporary work permit every
year.
These bureaucratic inefficiencies pale in comparison to the inhumanity of
a system that treats an internationally protected person like a common
criminal, who is sent to jail and released to life on parole. Notably, when the
humanitarian dimensions of the challenges faced by stateless persons are
made evident, the response is often that they should qualify as refugees. This
is often not the case, and the reasons for the inadequacy of the system of
asylum protection for the protection of stateless persons assists in an
understanding of the need for a separate protection mechanism.
C. Stateless Persons Invariably Apply for Asylum, but are Often Found
Ineligible and Ordered Removed
Often, the one hope that stateless persons have to escape legal limbo is to
successfully petition U.S. authorities for asylum. Myriad issues face stateless
asylum seekers, who in some regards must meet an even more difficult
burden than asylum seekers who have a nationality. Indeed, while asylum is
available both to persons with a nationality and those without, the novelty of
adjudicating asylum claims of stateless persons can lead to prejudicial errors
in findings of fact and law. For example, a mistake in the determination that
someone is or is not a national of a country can lead to a denial of asylum
against the wrong country, and a removal order will issue that can be near
impossible to revisit. In addition to the unique pitfalls that await stateless
asylum seekers, they also must meet the burden of every other refugee. This
can pose particular challenges to stateless persons where adjudicators often
59. Kirk Semple, Mass Release of Immigrants Is Tied to Impending Cuts, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/27/us/immigrants-released-ahead-of-automatic-budget-cuts.
html.
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do not understand the nature of their suffering as persons without a national-
ity, and fail to grasp the nature of the harm that they have suffered or that they
will likely suffer in the future.
Persons can often become stateless because of some vulnerability, such as
ethnicity, migratory status, or even some disfavored political opinion. Their
statelessness can compound their already existing vulnerability, and it can be
difficult to disaggregate which vulnerabilities are refugee-related and which
are related to stateless status. In the case of Mikhail, he originally sought
safety in the United States because of harm and insecurity he had suffered his
entire life on account of his Armenian ethnicity. While Mikhail was seeking
safe haven in the United States, he became stateless as a result of the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. This new dimension of vulnerability was
never considered part of his claim for refugee relief, which was ultimately
denied. Mikhail’s story is not uncommon in this regard; many stateless
persons seek asylum but fall short of that legal showing and fall into the
stateless legal limbo.
In order to receive asylum in the United States, a person must demonstrate
that he or she is:
outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a
person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return
to . . . that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion . . . .60
U.S. courts have consistently found that asylum law does not protect stateless
persons per se.61 Courts have reasoned that by requiring those with “no
nationality” to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
a protected ground, the INA explicitly precludes the mere condition of being
stateless as a basis for asylum, “[n]otwithstanding the recognition by both the
United States and the international community of the problem of stateless-
ness.”62 Accordingly, the challenge of stateless persons in the United States,
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2010).
61. Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 214 (3rd Cir. 2003); see also Faddoul v. Immigration &
Naturalization Service, 37 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 1994); Maksimova v. Holder, 361 F. App’x 690 (6th Cir.
2010); Fedosseeva v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2007); Pavlovich v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 613
(8th Cir. 2007); Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001). Notably, there is also broad
international consensus that a person who qualifies as stateless under the terms of the Statelessness
Convention does not necessarily qualify for protection under the Refugee Convention. See UNHCR,
HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS ¶ 102 (revised ed. 1992)
(noting “that not all stateless persons are refugees. They must be outside the country of their former
habitual residence for the reasons indicated in the definition. Where these reasons do not exist, the
stateless person is not a refugee.”); Revenko v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2000] A.C.
(appeal taken from Immigration Appeal Tribunal) (U.K.).
62. Ahmed, 341 F.3d at 218.
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like their refugee counterparts, is to demonstrate that the harm they have
suffered rises to the level of persecution and that their persecutor was
motivated in some substantial part by a protected characteristic.
Stateless persons, however, face an additional problem of demonstrating
that they have “no nationality” and which is their “country of last habitual
residence.” It bears emphasis that this threshold inquiry can be the difference
between protection and removal. For example, in the asylum case of a man
who had been raised as a strict Muslim in the West Bank, but later converted
to Christianity, the main point of contention was whether he was a Jordanian
citizen.63 The immigration court had determined that the individual was a
citizen of Jordan, and because he provided no evidence of any threat of harm
in that country, denied his asylum claim and ordered him removed to
Jordan.64 Upon review, the Seventh Circuit noted ample evidence in the
record that the petitioner was a stateless Palestinian, not a Jordanian citizen,
but because the petitioner had admitted Jordanian citizenship in the proceed-
ings, the court declined to overturn the agency determination.65 In so finding,
the circuit court noted the extremely deferential standard of review with
which it was compelled to the review agency’s “factual finding” as to
citizenship.66
Another threshold issue that stateless persons face in pursuing asylum
claims is whether they can establish that the country against which they want
their claim tested is indeed the country of last habitual residence. Courts have
made inconsistent determinations about what constitutes a stateless refugee’s
last habitual residence,67 and have struggled to determine what standard
should be applied in making this determination.68 The Third Circuit is the
63. See Zahren v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 2007).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1041-42.
66. Id. at 1042. The conclusion of the Seventh Circuit highlights a problem with failing to
provide a legal definition for statelessness in the INA or to create regulations to guide statelessness
determinations, namely, that many courts treat this as a factual determination that federal appeals
courts have limited capacity to review. See, e.g., In re S-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 462 (B.I.A. 2002)
(explaining that pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(ii)(3), the Board of Immigration Appeals reviews
findings of fact for “clear error”). But see Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 743, 746 (6th Cir. 2006)
(“[T]he BIA reversed the IJ’s conclusion regarding Jordanian citizenship, and instead concluded that
Almuhtaseb is a stateless Palestinian.”). Significantly, in the Seventh Circuit case, a petition for
rehearing was granted after the government spent three years trying to determine whether the
petitioner was indeed a Jordanian citizen, and upon re-review, the court remanded the case for further
deliberation at the agency level. See Zahren, 637 F.3d at 698. While crisis may have been averted in
that case, it illustrates the precariousness faced by stateless asylum seekers who must resolve the
complex question of their statelessness in order to secure relief.
67. Sarah B. Fenn, Note, Paripovic v. Gonzalez: Defining Last Habitual Residence for Stateless
Asylum Applicants, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1545, 1561-63 (2007) (demonstrating that courts have
found a stateless person’s last habitual residence to be the country where the person was born in some
instances, and in other instances have found it to be the country where the stateless person lived
temporarily for a two-year period, and in still other cases the courts have declined to even decide
which country would constitute the person’s last habitual residence).
68. See id. at 1466 (arguing that the Third Circuit’s decision in Paripovic v. Gonzales incorrectly
defined last habitual residence quantitatively, and instead should have considered intent).
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only court to date to specifically address the meaning of “last habitually
resided” for a stateless individual.69 That court gave deference to and
accepted the agency interpretation that someone who became stateless after
the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia had subsequently established
habitual residence during a two-year stint in a Serbian refugee camp.70 The
applicant did not have an asylum claim against Serbia, however, and was
ordered removed. Under this rule, stateless persons who are forced to flee
conflict and seek safe haven in a refugee camp may lose the possibility of
pursuing asylum relief in the United States because the country where the
camp is located becomes the “last habitual residence.”
Once a stateless asylum seeker makes these threshold showings of “no
nationality” and the “country of last habitual residence,” he or she must
demonstrate “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.”71 Volumes have been written about this phrase, but for the
purposes of this discussion, it can be considered as two separate showings.
First, a stateless asylum seeker must show that harm suffered in the past was
sufficiently severe to trigger protection, or that there is a likelihood of
sufficiently severe harm in the future.72 Second, a stateless asylum seeker
must demonstrate that such harm was, or will be, inflicted to overcome or
punish one of the five grounds for refugee protection.73
While stateless persons consistently seek refugee protection, there is
surprisingly little clarity on the exact relationship between statelessness and
persecution. One reason for this is that the term “persecution” is not defined
in the INA.74 Courts have interpreted persecution to cover a wide range of
physical, psychological, and even economic abuse,75 and have reached
consensus as to the qualification of certain forms of severe abuse as
persecution per se.76 Importantly, the notion that certain mistreatment, such
69. Paripovic v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 240, 245-46 (3rd Cir. 2005).
70. Id. at 245 (citing Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
71. INA § 101(a)(42); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2012).
72. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2012).
73. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2012).
74. For a discussion of efforts to define persecution, see Scott Rempell, Defining Persecution,
2013.1 UTAH L. REV. 283 (2013).
75. See, e.g., Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995) (defining persecution as “the
infliction of suffering or harm . . . regarded as offensive . . . [but it] does not include every sort of
treatment our society regards as offensive . . . . Discrimination . . . does not ordinarily amount to
‘persecution’ . . . [but], in extraordinary cases, [it can] be so severe and pervasive as to constitute
‘persecution’ . . . .”); Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 989-90 (8th Cir. 2004) (observing that
persecution encompasses “the infliction or threat of death, torture, or injury to one’s person or
freedom . . .”); In re T-Z, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163 (B.I.A. 2007) (holding that nonphysical forms of harm,
such as the deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage or the deprivation of liberty, food,
housing, employment, or other essentials of life, may amount to persecution).
76. See Shoafera v. INS, 228 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding persecution occurred where
there was rape or sexual assault); Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding
that ethnic cleansing was persecution); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding
that female genital mutilation was persecution).
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as harassment, is an insufficiently severe form of “punishment or . . . inflic-
tion of harm” to qualify as persecution, is common.77
Courts have found stateless persons to have suffered persecution when
they have been able to demonstrate sufficiently severe treatment related to
their stateless status. For example, the Ninth Circuit has found that a stateless
Palestinian who fled his native Kuwait, established asylum eligibility based
on his minority status, where Kuwait engaged in forced expulsions and
discrimination of Palestinians, who were also denied the right to work, go to
school, or obtain drinking water.78 This is different from the important
question of when, if ever, government actions that leave people stateless may
be considered persecution.
A number of federal courts of appeal have raised questions with
regard to the relationship between deprivation of nationality—also called
denationalization—and persecution.79 The most notable example is the
Seventh Circuit litigation in Haile v. Gonzalez (Haile I and Haile II), which
involved ethnic Eritreans born in Ethiopia who sought asylum based on
Ethiopia’s arbitrary expulsion and denationalization of approximately 75,000
persons of Eritrean ethnicity.80 The asylum seekers in Haile I had escaped
from Ethiopia without personally suffering any mistreatment, though they
were effectively stripped of their Ethiopian citizenship and left stateless.81
The Seventh Circuit found it “arguable that such a program of denationaliza-
tion and deportation is in fact a particularly acute form of persecution,” and
remanded this question to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).82 In
Haile II,83 after the BIA once again affirmed the removal order of one
individual,84 the Seventh Circuit found that “[i]f Ethiopia denationalized the
petitioner because of his Eritrean ethnicity, it did so because of hostility to
Eritreans,” and concluded that “if to be made stateless is persecution, as we
believe, . . . then to be deported to the country that made you stateless and
continues to consider you stateless is to be subjected to persecution even if
the country will allow you to remain and will not bother you as long as you
77. See, e.g., Bace v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1133, 1137 (7th Cir. 2003) (stressing that the actions
must go beyond mere harassment).
78. Himri v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 932 (9th Cir 2004).
79. See discussion of Sixth and Seventh Circuit decisions in Maryellen Fullerton, The Intersec-
tion of Statelessness and Refugee Protection in US Asylum Policy, 2.3 J. MIGRATION & HUMAN
SECURITY 144 (2014), available at http://jmhs.cmsny.org/index.php/jmhs/article/view/30.
80. Haile v. Gonzales (Haile I), 421 F.3d 493 (7th Cir. 2005); Haile v. Holder (Haile II), 591 F.3d
572 (7th Cir. 2010).
81. Haile I, 421 F.3d at 494-95.
82. Id. at 496-97.
83. Haile II, 591 F.3d 572.
84. It is unclear from the opinion of the court what happened in the case of the second petition in
Haile I on remand.
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behave yourself.”85
While this decision of the Seventh Circuit provides a reasonably clear rule
for that jurisdiction, the court’s reasoning leaves some unanswered questions.
One such question is when denationalization may be considered to have
occurred “on account of” a protected ground.
This question adds a layer of complexity to the persecution inquiry, which
concerns the severity of the harm suffered. The U.S. Supreme Court has
found that in order to establish a nexus to a protected ground, an asylum
applicant must show through direct or circumstantial evidence that the
persecutor was motived by a desire to overcome a protected ground.86 The
U.S. Congress has further clarified that the protected ground must be “one
central reason” for the persecution.87 The nexus problem surfaces in many
cases of denationalization through state succession, like the many cases that
result from the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,88
where individuals suffer a deprivation of nationality but face difficulty in
providing evidence that the denationalization occurred on account of a
protected ground.89
Once a removal order has been issued against a stateless person, who
cannot be removed, the predictable chain of events described above unfolds.
Indeed, the stories of Mikhail trapped in American Samoa, Artour languish-
ing in unending detention, and Tatianna and David struggling to assert their
humanity, all followed asylum denials. Nevertheless, their experiences illus-
trate perfectly why stateless persons are an internationally protected group
and provide a narrative that demands a legislative solution. Now that such a
solution has been proposed, the challenge is to both keep the momentum
85. See Haile II, 591 F.3d at 574.
86. INS v. Elias Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
88. See, e.g., Stserba v. Holder, 646 F.3d 964 (6th Cir. 2011). In Stserba, one petitioner lost her
citizenship when Estonia gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Id. at 969. The Sixth
Circuit remanded the case to the BIA for further consideration whether the denationalization was
ethnically motivated. Id. The court considered that she was an Estonian citizen under Soviet rule, and
that the decision of Estonia to limit citizenship only to pre-1940 citizens after independence was very
possibly a manipulation of “citizenship rules to exclude ethnic Russians who immigrated during the
Soviet occupation.” Id. at 974. The court further noted that policies required that persons who had
become citizens during Soviet rule could only become citizens if they demonstrated language ability
and knowledge of history, and as such it considered that they contained “an irreducible ethnic
element.” Id. at 975.
89. There are clear indications that this population accounts for a substantial portion of the
stateless persons in the United States. In August 2011, the author submitted a study of statelessness in
the United States to the UNHCR and the Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI), entitled “Stateless
Persons in the United States: Without Status, Protection or Recourse.” Among other analyses, this
study presented the results of a review of every federal court decision that involved a stateless party,
an analysis of close to a decade of asylum statistics published by the U.S. government, and a survey of
immigration practitioners around the country. This report ultimately served as the basis for the 2012
report published jointly by UNHCR and OSJI. UNHCR & OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, CITIZENS
OF NOWHERE: SOLUTIONS FOR THE STATELESS IN THE U.S. (2012), available at http://www.refworld.org/
docid/50c620f62.html.
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towards passage into law and to ensure that it is implemented it in a way that
will meaningfully address the problem of statelessness.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION AND THE ROLE FOR INTERNATIONAL
GUIDANCE
It is only very recently that a coordinated response to statelessness within
the United States has been seriously suggested by the legislature.90 Most
significantly, a provision for “The Protection of Certain Stateless Persons in
the United States” in the bi-partisan Border Security, Economic Opportunity,
and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013 (SB 744) would provide a
comprehensive legal framework to address the stateless legal limbo.91
The SB 744 statelessness protection proposal was included among a series
of reforms to the U.S. system of asylum and refugee protection, which is
fitting when one considers the historic connection between these populations.
It is also fitting in the sense that the proposed statelessness determination and
protection mechanism mirror asylum protection in many significant ways.
Namely, the proposal includes: a legal definition of stateless person that
would be incorporated into the INA; an application procedure, which
includes eligibility criteria, exclusions and waivers, and rules for employ-
ment authorization and derivative beneficiaries; considerations for stateless
persons to adjust status to Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR); some informa-
tion about evidentiary considerations; and provisions establishing rules for
administrative review, reopening proceedings, and judicial review.92
90. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437-38 (1987) (“[O]ne of Congress’ primary
purposes was to bring the United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees . . . .”). Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) made the first
legislative proposal to protect stateless persons in his Refugee Protection Act (RPA) of 2010, a
section of which would provide for the “Protection of Stateless Persons in the United States.” S. 3113,
111th Cong. § 24 (2010). A hearing on the RPA provided important visibility for this legislation.
Reviewing America’s Commitment to the Refugee Convention: The Refugee Protection Act of 2010:
Hearing on S. 3113 Before the S. Committeee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (May 19, 2010), available
at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg58223/pdf/CHRG-111shrg58223.pdf. The stateless-
ness provision of the 2010 RPA was included in the 2010 Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act,
presented by Senator Robert Menéndez (D-NJ). Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2010, S.
3932, 111th Cong. § 257 (Sept. 29, 2010), available at http://www.opencongress.org/bill/s3932-111/
text. Sen. Leahy introduced the RPA again in June 2011, with some changes, and in this way it
continued to be a centerpiece for the conversation about statelessness in the United States. However,
none of these proposals gained the traction in the Senate achieved by SB 744.
91. Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013, S. 744,
113th Cong. § 3405 (2013), available at https://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/
744/text.
92. See generally Refugee Protection Act of 2011, S. 1202, 112th Cong. § 210A(b)(2). Indeed,
the procedural similarities between the stateless persons determination and protection proposal and
U.S. asylum procedures are striking. Namely, one would be able to apply affirmatively or defensively
for stateless status. § 210A(e). Denials could be appealed to Federal Circuit Courts. § 3405(b). Once
granted stateless status, an individual receives work authorization, may request a travel document,
and may apply for derivative spouses and children to join his or her stateless status. § 210A(b)(5), (6),
(7). After one year in stateless status, an individual would be eligible to apply to adjust his or her
status to LPR. § 210A(c).
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This means that a stateless person who is not a refugee would be able to
submit to a very similar process and acquire rights very similar to that of a
refugee, thereby eliminating the stateless legal limbo. However, before such
a law and the necessary regulations are implemented and before adjudica-
tions commence, it is difficult to say how effective such a protection will
ultimately be. Nevertheless, due to the relatively small population at issue,
the administrative inefficiency associated with the stateless legal limbo, and
the intense level of vulnerability endured by this population, it is imperative
to develop a meaningful critique of the proposal so as to ensure that the
version that is ultimately passed into law addresses the problem it was
designed to resolve.
The UNHCR has recently produced the Handbook on Protection of
Stateless Persons (Statelessness Handbook or Handbook),93 which provides
a framework for the analysis of the SB 744 proposal. The Statelessness
Handbook provides authoritative interpretations of the provisions of the 1954
Statelessness Convention, and was produced through a process of interna-
tional expert consultations that informed the production of the first-ever
regulations on statelessness protection. The Handbook guidance addresses
the criteria for determining statelessness, including the definition and the
interpretation of relevant terms, the procedures for the determination of
statelessness, and the status of stateless persons on the national level.94 An
analysis of the SB 744 proposal in light of this international guidance
highlights the ways in which a U.S. statelessness mechanism may fail to
address the stateless legal limbo.
A. The Proposed Definition and Status of Stateless Persons in the United
States are Consistent with Standards for International Protection
The definition of “stateless person” and the legal status that will be
accorded to persons who qualify as such are set forth in SB 744 proposed
sections 210A(a) and (b), respectively. The definition is a clear, single
sentence that, most importantly, mirrors the 1954 Convention definition in all
meaningful ways. The legal status envisioned by SB 744 for stateless persons
is described in provisions 210A(b)(5), (6), and (7), which provide for
conditional legal status, work authorization, travel documents, and the
opportunity to apply for derivative legal status for spouses and children.
Further, section 210A(c) provides the framework for stateless persons to
adjust their status to LPR, which puts them on a path towards U.S.
citizenship. In this regard, the legal status set forth in the SB 744 proposal
puts stateless persons on the track to resolving their stateless status through
93. UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON THE PROTECTION OF STATELESS PERSONS UNDER THE 1954 CONVEN-
TION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF STATELESS PERSONS (2014), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
53b698ab9.pdf [hereinafter STATELESSNESS HANDBOOK].
94. Id.
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the acquisition of citizenship, and thereby meets international standards
articulated in the Statelessness Handbook.
According to the UNHCR, perhaps the most significant contribution of the
Statelessness Convention to international law is its definition of “stateless
person,”95 which is now considered customary international law.96 It is
therefore particularly important that the SB744 proposal largely tracks the
definition of “stateless person” provided in the Statelessness Convention.
Specifically, proposed Section 210A of the INA would define “stateless
person” as “an individual who is not considered a national under the
operation of the laws of any country.”97 This is nearly identical to the
Statelessness Convention, which provides protection to any “person who is
not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.”98
The symmetry between the Convention definition of stateless person and
the U.S. proposal is encouraging. At first blush, it would appear that Mikhail,
as well as Artour and Tatianna, would be covered by this definition. Of
course, it is impossible to establish this to a certainty without analyzing the
documentation of each individual, his or her lived experience, and of course
the nationality laws of any country implicated. Nevertheless, the fact that
they all traveled with passports from the Soviet Union, which ceased to exist,
and that successor states subsequently refused to recognize their rights as
nationals at the very least constitutes a prima facie case of statelessness under
the proposed definition.
However, while the nearly identical language of the Statelessness Conven-
tion definition and the U.S. proposal might suggest that the latter would be
interpreted in a manner consistent with the former, there is no guarantee of
interpretive harmony. Potential pitfalls could arise in the interpretation of the
single sentence definition of “stateless person” by U.S. immigration authori-
ties, as restrictive interpretations could substantially limit the availability of
this relief.
Here, an analogy to the U.S. asylum context is instructive. Over the years,
numerous questions with regard to the definition of terms have been the
subject of extensive litigation. Ambiguities relating the intended meaning of
“persecution,”99 as well as the exact nature of the “on account of” nexus
requirement,100 are just a few prominent examples that were discussed above
in relation to stateless asylum seekers. On both of these points, observers
have leveled critiques against the United States for departing from interna-
tional standards and guidance and thereby limiting important refugee protec-
95. Statelessness Convention, supra note 15, at 3.
96. See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug. 11, 2006, U.N.
Doc. A/65/10, at 49.
97. S. 744, 113th Cong. § 3405 (proposed INA § 210A(a)(1)).
98. Statelessness Convention, supra note 15.
99. See Rempell, supra note 74.
100. See, e.g., Karen Musalo, Revising Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Cases: A
Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 777 (2003).
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tions domestically.101
The definition of “stateless person” is no less open to debate, and the
limited experience with this subject in the United States makes it an area in
which guidance will be particularly important in order to accurately identify
stateless persons and to eliminate their legal limbo along with its many
detrimental consequences. The Statelessness Handbook, in its first section on
the criteria for determining statelessness, hones in on these interpretive
questions and provides thoughtful, expert insight into everything from the
meaning of “state,” to the potentially murky concept of “not considered as a
national . . . under the operation of its law.”102
Practical examples of how this guidance could assist in arriving at sound
stateless determinations in the case studies provided above abound. Notably,
while Mikhail was born in Azerbaijan and Artour was born in Georgia, they
were both ethnically Armenian. Indeed, their Armenian descent was the root
cause of their initial displacement and migration throughout the Soviet
Union. It is also true that their Armenian ethnicity, or the potential Armenian
citizenship of their parents, could serve as the basis for a finding that they are
Armenian nationals. In fact, Article 10 of the 1995 Armenian citizenship law
provides that: “Ethnic Armenian citizens of the former Arm. SSR, who live
out side the Republic of Armenia and have not acquired the citizenship of
another country,”103 will be recognized as citizens of the Republic of
Armenia.104
The proper consideration of this statement of black letter Armenian law,
and the inquiry into whether Mikhail and Artour are “not considered . . . na-
tional[s] under the operation of the laws of any country,” are at the heart of
the statelessness determination. It would be easy to read this statement and
make a reflexive determination that both Mikhail and Artour are citizens of
the Republic of Armenia and therefore not entitled to statelessness protec-
tion. But that would be the wrong outcome in their cases, evidenced by the
fact that Armenia refused to recognize either man as a citizen when they were
in post-removal order detention and ICE was engaged in exhaustive efforts to
deport them.
The Statelessness Handbook provides helpful insight in this regard,
emphasizing that whether a person is “not considered a national” is an
individualized determination that is a mixed question of law and fact, and
providing guidance on a wide-range of related inquiries.105 The Handbook
articulates the concepts of automatic and non-automatic citizenship, and
101. See, e.g., Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimensions of U.S. Refugee Law, 15 BERKELEY
J. INT’L L. 1, 15-24 (1997).
102. STATELESSNESS HANDBOOK, supra note 93.
103. The Law indicates that this was the product of an August 2011 amendment.
104. LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA ON THE CITIZENSHIP OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA (1995),
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/51b770884.html.
105. STATELESSNESS HANDBOOK, supra note 93, at 23.
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insists on an inquiry into competency of the authorities that make determina-
tions in this regard for purposes of establishing statelessness. The Handbook
takes the additional helpful step of equating “operation of law” with “law and
practice,” which widens the range of relevant evidence beyond black letter
law, and provides criteria for evaluating evidence of actions by competent
authorities.106 Applying this guidance to Mikhail and Artour’s cases would
certainly boost the chance that the conclusory phrase in Armenian citizenship
law would not be determinative in their cases, and relegate them to the
stateless legal limbo in error.
It is also very important that, once persons are determined to be “stateless
persons” pursuant to the definition proposed by SB 744, the law also
envisions a status for them that complies with the international law of
statelessness. The UNHCR has reiterated that the object and purpose of the
Statelessness Convention is to “ensure that stateless persons enjoy the widest
possible exercise of their human rights.”107 Those determined to be “stateless
persons” under the SB 744 regime would achieve a level of security in ways
that relate to fundamental human rights, such as the right to work, the
freedom to circulate, the protection of family unity, to say nothing of the
drastically reduced risk of detention.
Those relegated to the stateless legal limbo in the United States regularly
refer to precariousness in acquiring work authorization, strict travel restric-
tions, and an inability to reunite with family members in other parts of the
world. Indeed, all of these concerns have been voiced in many forms by
Tatianna.108 The proposed stateless status would address these concerns head
on by virtually guaranteeing the rights to work, travel and family reunifica-
tion. The uneasiness Tatianna describes at her check-ins with immigration
authorities and the fear that she could be arbitrarily detained would be
eliminated. Indeed, the proposed protection mechanism envisions a clear
path to LPR status, which potentially leads to citizenship—the ultimate
solution to statelessness and the insecurity that accompanies that precarious
state.
Under the SB744 proposal, stateless persons who apply for stateless status
become eligible for work authorization as soon as they are determined to be
prima facie eligible.109 This is a significant recognition both of the impor-
tance of work to persons awaiting status in the United States, as well as the
possible delays in adjudication once the mechanism is in place. By only
requiring a prima facie eligibility finding, the law creates a framework to
106. Id. at 25-36.
107. Id. at 14.
108. See Lesnikova, supra note 56; Shamander Dulai and Moises Medoza, Stateless: The
Ultimate Legal Limbo, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/stateless-ultimate-legal-
limbo-319461.
109. See S. 744, 113th Cong. § 3405(5).
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ensure that people are able to support themselves while immigration authori-
ties are engaged in the complex analysis of foreign laws and alleged facts.
This leaves open the question of how authorities will determine prima
facie eligibility, which again raises a caution about the possible negative
effects of strict interpretation. In the U.S. asylum context, where asylum
seekers are eligible for work authorization 180 days after applying for
asylum, many difficulties have arisen with arbitrary tolling of this waiting
period.110 Indeed, the desperation of persons awaiting work authorization has
been evidenced in a wide range of cases for humanitarian immigration
relief,111 and the model set forth in the SB 744 statelessness mechanism
could be a best practice if it is effectively put into practice.
Once immigration authorities confer stateless status under the proposed
law, a stateless individual would become eligible for travel documents.112
This is important both because it permits stateless persons to travel and visit
family in other parts of the world and because it provides stateless persons
with a possibility to migrate to another country where they may have family
or other important ties. It is important to remember that stateless persons do
not necessarily want to stay in the United States.113 Rather, they are stranded;
and providing them with travel documents would give them the freedom to
reestablish themselves where they feel most at home. Further, and perhaps
even more important, a family reunification provision permits those persons
conferred stateless status in the United States to obtain conditional lawful
status for their spouse and children, assuming they are not subject to certain
grounds of inadmissibility and that the qualifying relationship existed before
the status was granted.114
Stateless persons granted stateless status under the law would be eligible to
adjust their status to LPR after one year.115 The proposed law requires that
applicants for adjustment of status qualify as stateless, be physically present
in the United States for at least one year after being granted their stateless
status, and not be firmly resettled in another country.116 Moreover, applicants
110. See, e.g., LEGAL ACTION CENTER, A.B.T. ET AL. V. USCIS, ET AL.: A NATIONWIDE CLASS
ACTION TO FIX THE “ASYLUM CLOCK” TERMS OF SETTLEMENT, available at http://legalactioncenter.org/
sites/default/files/KLOK_fact_sheet_4-15-13.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2016).
111. See KRISZTINA E. SZABO ET AL., EARLY ACCESS TO WORK AUTHORIZATION FOR VAWA
SELF-PETITIONERS AND U VISA APPLICANTS (NIWAP 2014), available at http://www.niwap.org/reports/
Early-Access-to-Work-Authorization.pdf.
112. See S. 744, 113th Cong. § 3405 (proposed INA § 210A(a)(1)).
113. Yury Decyatnik, ‘I want to leave the US forever’, PRAVDA REPORT (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://english.pravda.ru/society/stories/10-06-2014/127768-leave_usa-0/.
114. S. 744, 113th Cong. § 3405 (proposed INA § 210A(a)(1)).
115. Id. This timeline for adjustment has shifted with the different proposals for statelessness
protection in recent years. While the 2010 version of the RPA only required one year in stateless
status before adjustment, the 2011 version increased the required period of stateless status to five
years. Compare Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2010 S. 3932, 111th Cong. § 257
(proposed INA § 210A(c)(1)), with Refugee Protection Act of 2011, S. 1202, 112th Cong. § 17
(proposed INA § 210A(c)(1)).
116. S. 744, 113th Cong. § 3405.
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must not have become inadmissible to the United States under the provisions
of the INA that would have disqualified them for stateless status.117 Finally,
once a stateless person has adjusted to LPR status, he or she would become
eligible to become a U.S. citizen in five years and thus resolve their stateless
status permanently.118
The proposed stateless status under the INA is in harmony with the
Statelessness Convention, as well as the recent guidance published by the
UNHCR in the Statelessness Handbook. Indeed, the Handbook interprets
the Convention as permitting the conferral of rights on a gradual, conditional
scale.119 Specifically, the Handbook provides that individuals awaiting the
decisions of statelessness determination mechanisms should enjoy, inter alia,
identity papers, a right to employment, freedom of movement, and protection
against expulsion.120 The Handbook further interprets the Statelessness
Convention to require that residence permits be provided to persons deter-
mined to be stateless and that stateless status be accompanied by the right to
work, healthcare and social assistance, as well as a travel document.121
Accordingly, the security provided to those seeking stateless protection, the
status accorded to those persons determined to be stateless, and the path to
citizenship available to stateless persons are all consistent with the frame-
work for international protection set forth in the Statelessness Convention.
Finally, the SB 744 proposal leaves little room for interpretation on this
question of the quality of stateless status; thus, compliance with the Stateless-
ness Convention in this regard appears manifest.
If indeed both the proposed definition of “stateless person” and the status
that such a person would enjoy under the law comply with the international
law of statelessness, the looming question relates to how a person will
achieve this status. If the definition, on its face, covers persons such as
Mikhail, Artour, and Tatianna, it must next be resolved whether there is
anything in the procedure set out by the law that would prevent them from
qualifying for the law’s protection. In this regard, an area of concern is the
procedure for determining whether a person is stateless, and a number of key
issues relating to standards of proof and evidence remain open for interpreta-
tion. There is little guidance on these issues in the current version of the law,
and should U.S. authorities take a restrictive approach to these matters,
stateless persons’ access to stateless status could be severely limited.
117. Id.
118. See Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, Pub. L. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163.
119. STATELESSNESS HANDBOOK, supra note 93, at 47.
120. Id. at 52.
121. Id. at 53.
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B. The Proposed Protection Mechanism May Be Too Limited to
Meaningfully Address the Stateless Legal Limbo
The protection mechanism proposed by SB 744 includes five eligibility
criteria. Pursuant to these criteria, the person seeking protection must show
that he or she: (A) is a stateless person present in the United States; (B) has
applied for such relief; (C) has not lost his or her nationality as a result of his
or her voluntary action or knowing inaction after arrival in the United States;
(D) is not inadmissible under certain criminal and security provisions of the
INA;122 and (E) has not participated in the persecution of others.123 This
protection mechanism can best be understood as encompassing a stateless-
ness determination on the one hand and then an assessment of bars to
eligibility on the other. In exploring the challenges that may arise in the
functioning of this mechanism, international law and guidance will again
provide important insight.
Here, U.S. asylum law again provides a helpful analogy in understanding
challenges that may emerge in statelessness adjudication because of their
historical, substantive, and procedural similarities. As a historical matter, it is
important to recall that the 1954 Statelessness Convention was elaborated
alongside the 1951 Refugee Convention and that the two Conventions were
intended to work together to provide a comprehensive scheme for relief to
persons in need of international protection. In fact, UNHCR has suggested
that national systems for protection for refugees and stateless persons should
be linked,124 and many countries that have developed stateless protection
systems have linked them to systems for asylum adjudication.125
The substantive and procedural similarities between U.S. asylum law and
the proposed stateless person protection framework also serve as a rationale
for utilizing this analogy. With regards to the statelessness determination,
embodied in provisions (A) and (B) of the stateless protection mechanism,
there is the implicit need to establish a standard of proof and articulate
evidentiary considerations. These have been major areas of contention in
U.S. asylum adjudications, and that experience has relevance to this analysis,
particularly where international law guidance has provided assistance to U.S.
adjudicators. In the same manner, many of the exceptions embodied in
provisions (C) through (E) are also exceptions to asylum protection, and
there is a body of jurisprudence and scholarship that provides insight both in
the compatibility of these exceptions with international law norms as well as
122. While certain other grounds of inadmissibility do apply, most are waivable. See S. 744
§ 3405 (proposed INA § 210A(b)(1), (2), (3)).
123. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(2)(ii).
124. STATELESSNESS HANDBOOK, supra note 93, at 31.
125. See EUROPEAN NETWORK ON STATELESSNESS, STATELESSNESS DETERMINATION AND TEH PROTEC-
TION STATUS OF STATELESS PERSONS 9 (2013), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/53162a2f4.
html (highlighting that the asylum authorties in France, Moldova, Spain, the Philippines, and the
United Kingdom are responsible for statelessness determinations).
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their impact on U.S. asylum protection. The following sections explore in
greater detail the potential problems that may arise with these aspects of the
proposed stateless person protection mechanism.
1. Potential Challenges in Establishing Standards of Proof and Evidence
for a Statelessness Determination
Together, provisions (A) and (B) require an application for relief and an
official statelessness determination. Presumably, regulations would follow
the passage of these statutory provisions into law that will specify how to
make such an application as well as how immigration authorities will make
the determination. One substantial question that is left open in the current
legislative proposal is the standard of proof for establishing that one is a
“stateless person” under the law. While it is understandable that this is not an
issue that legislators would think to resolve at the outset, this was perhaps
one of the most contentious issues in the early years of implementation of the
Refugee Act.
In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the U.S. Supreme Court established the
standard of proof for asylum protection and thereby defined the scope of
protection in a way that meant the difference between protection and death
for hundreds of thousands of people.126 In that case the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the hotly contested meaning of the statutory language “well-
founded fear of persecution” that is central to the refugee definition.127 It
considered this legal question in the context of Luz Marina Cardoza Fonse-
ca’s asylum claim, in which she claimed that the Sandanistas in her native
Nicaragua would imprison and torture her to discover the whereabouts of her
brother, who was a known political dissident.128 The immigration court had
applied the “more likely than not” standard to both her claim for withholding
of deportation as well as her claim for asylum, denying both when it found
that she had not demonstrated more than a fifty percent likelihood of being
126. INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987).
127. Id. at 440. By way of background, just three years before deciding Cardoza-Fonseca, the
U.S. Supreme Court decided INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984), in which it found that a non-citizen
applying for “withholding of deportation” was required to show that “it is more likely than not that
the alien would be subject to persecution” in the country to which he or she would be returned.
Withholding of deportation, now also known as withholding of removal (currently at both INA
§§ 243(h) and 241(b)(3), respectively), was considered by the Court in Stevic to be the domestic
incarnation of the nonfoulemont protection embodied in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. Stevic,
467 U.S. at 418-19. While parties did not dispute that withholding of deportation required a “more
likely than not” showing prior to the ratification of the Protocol to the Refugee Convention in 1968,
Stevic argued that such ratification changed the standard of proof to “well-founded fear,” which he
also argued was a lower standard. Id. at 413-14. The Court concluded that Congress had intended to
retain the “more likely than not” standard in the withholding of deportation context when it ratified
the 1967 Protocol and that the showing of a more-than-fifty-percent likelihood of harm therefore
persisted under the 1980 Refugee Act. Id. at 425-26. The Court deferred the question of which
standard should be used to asses a “well-founded fear of persecution” in the context of an asylum
claim, inasmuch as this issue was not squarely presented in Stevic. Id. at 429-30.
128. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. at 424-25.
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harmed in Nicaragua.129 The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the
“well-founded fear” that is required to establish eligibility for asylum
pursuant to the 1980 Refugee Act required a showing of only a ten percent
likelihood of persecution.130
There were a number of very compelling reasons for the Court to decide
Cardoza-Fonseca in the way it did,131 but for the purposes of this discussion
it is most important to highlight the Court’s determination that its conclusion
was supported by authoritative interpretations of the Refugee Convention.132
In so finding, the Court noted that Congress had intended to bring the United
States into compliance with its international obligations under the Refugee
Convention when it passed the Refugee Act.133 The Court demonstrated this
intent by pointing to the similarities in the language used to define “refugee”
in the Convention and the Act. The Court went a step further and explored
the intent of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries in crafting the refugee
definition in the manner that it did, assuming that intent must be consistent
with the intent of Congress in passing the Refugee Act.134
The Supreme Court then looked to the UNHCR’s Handbook on Proce-
dures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Refugee Handbook), and
found that it supported the Court’s understanding of the intent of the
Conference of Plenipotentiaries in crafting the refugee definition. It observed
that “[t]here is simply no room in the United Nations’ definition for
concluding that because an applicant only has a 10% chance of being shot,
tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no ‘well-founded fear’ of
the event happening.”135 Accordingly, it found that this must have also been
the intent of the U.S. Congress in passing the 1980 Refugee Act. The
Supreme Court concluded that the plain language of the INA, its symmetry
with the Refugee Convention, and its legislative history clearly supported a
lower standard of proof to demonstrate eligibility for asylum.
Recalling this extremely contentious question in the early years of asylum
adjudications in the United States, one can easily imagine how a similar
question may arise when adjudicators must determine whether an applicant
for stateless status is indeed stateless. Under the SB 744 proposal, one must
demonstrate that they are “not considered a national under the operation of
the laws of any country.” As a starting point, to hold an applicant for stateless
status to a 100% standard of proof could be practically impossible, where it
would conceivably require communications with every country in the world.
The Statelessness Handbook suggests limiting the inquiry to those states with
129. Id.
130. Id. at 449.
131. Id. at 431-32, 441-43.
132. Id. at 449.
133. Id. at 436-37.
134. Id. at 437.
135. Id. at 440.
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which the applicant enjoys a “relevant link, in particular by birth on the
territory, descent, marriage, adoption or habitual residence.”136 Even with a
more limited scope of inquiry, though, it is easy to imagine how exhaustive
applications to every state authority that could opine as to the nationality of
an individual could take years to complete.
The Statelessness Handbook advises using the same standard of proof as a
refugee status determination, requiring that applicants establish to a “reason-
able degree” that they are not considered a national by any country.137
Applying the standard of proof set by the Supreme Court in Cardoza-
Fonseca to the statelessness context would mean that an applicant for
stateless status would have to demonstrate a ten percent likelihood that he or
she is not considered a national under the operation of laws of any country.
In addition to the guidance of the international refugee and statelessness
protection frameworks, and the precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court, which
explicitly incorporated the former, there are many practical reasons why U.S.
immigration authorities should follow this guidance. First, one must recall
the difficulties that were presented in the discussion above of Mikhail and
Artour’s cases of statelessness under the law of Armenia. The difficult factual
questions that arise in a statelessness determination must be answered with
country conditions evidence, as well as individual factual accounts that—like
the refugee context—may rely heavily on hearsay and inference. Indeed, the
difficulties that arise in proving the likelihood of future harm in an asylum
case, where the individuals seeking protection often fled dangerous situations
with little more than the clothes on their backs, seem to characterize the
statelessness case as well. Stateless persons must prove a negative and do so
with evidence that likely does not exist.
The Statelessness Handbook highlights the difficulties inherent in proving
statelessness, and lends additional emphasis to the consequences of incor-
rectly rejecting an application.138 While the Handbook refers more to the
troubling implications of denying humanitarian relief to an internationally
protected person—sound concerns to be sure—there is an additional dimen-
sion that is particularly relevant in the U.S. context. Specifically, the prior
section laid plain the administrative inefficiencies attendant in the stateless
legal limbo in the United States. Rather than expend resources on futile
removal efforts that distract immigration officers and squander taxpayer
dollars and that aggravate open human rights wounds, applying a standard
that requires only a “reasonable degree” of certainty is preferable.
As for the evidentiary considerations that will be relevant for meeting this
standard of proof, the SB 744 proposal offers limited guidance. First, the
proposed law provides that the Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland
136. STATELESSNESS HANDBOOK, supra note 93, at 11.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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Security may consider any credible evidence in making the determination of
eligibility for stateless status and gives those authorities sole discretion in
determining what evidence is credible and the weight that should be accorded
to any evidence presented.139 Second, the proposed law includes an explicit
requirement that any applicant submit any passport or travel document in his
or her possession, or a sworn affidavit explaining why such passport or travel
document either does not exist or cannot be submitted.140
Evidentiary standards have also been a very important topic in U.S.
asylum law. About a decade after the Supreme Court decided Cardoza-
Fonseca, the BIA sent another similarly powerful message to immigration
authorities with In re S-M-J-.141 In that case, the immigration judge had
denied a Liberian woman’s claim for asylum, which arose out of a coup
against the Liberian government, for failure to carry her burden of proof.
According to the applicant she would likely be targeted because of her
relationship to her father, who was the governor of the Vai tribe in Liberia and
had been targeted by the government; her uncle, who was the Liberian
Ambassador in Zaire and needed to be evacuated to the United States; and
her brother-in-law “Prince Anderson,” though she provided no details about
him.142 There was exceedingly little evidence in the record about the events
of which the applicant testified, such that her claim was denied due to
inadequate support.
The BIA began its analysis of the relevant evidentiary requirements by
recalling that the U.S. Congress had intended to implement obligations under
the Refugee Convention when it created asylum protection under U.S. law.143
It went on to observe that: “Because this Board, the Immigration Judges, and
the Immigration and Naturalization Service are all bound to uphold this law,
we all bear the responsibility of ensuring that refugee protection is provided
where such protection is warranted by the circumstances of an asylum
applicant’s claim.”144 The BIA specifically discussed the roles of the appli-
cant, the INS, and the immigration judge in providing evidence during the
claim’s adjudication. With respect to the applicant, the BIA specifically
referenced the guidance of the UNHCR Handbook, finding that the applicant
had to testify credibly and provide all corroborating evidence that could
reasonably be provided.145
As for the INS, the BIA reiterated that: “the Service has an obligation to
uphold international refugee law, including the United States’ obligation to
139. See S. 744 § 3405 (proposed INA § 210A(d)).
140. See id. (proposed INA § 210A(b)(4)).
141. In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 1997).
142. Id. at 723.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 724-25.
2015] LIFE AFTER LIMBO 383
extend refuge where such refuge is warranted.”146 Similarly, as to the
immigration Judge, the BIA recalled that the UNHCR Handbook provided
that the “role of the asylum adjudicator is to ensure that the applicant presents
his case as fully as possible and with all available evidence.”147 Ultimately,
the BIA concluded that both the INS and the immigration judge had an
obligation to present evidence and to ascertain the level of risk faced by the
asylum applicant despite the fact that it was the applicant’s burden of
proof.148 The BIA then remanded the case before it and ordered the INS and
immigration judge to take seriously their responsibility to evaluate the claim
for protection.149
In addition to sending a strong message to the principal actors in immigra-
tion enforcement about their obligations under international refugee law, the
BIA set standards for assessment of the credibility of applicants and the need
to corroborate claims made in the application. These standards reverberated
throughout the system of asylum adjudication for nearly a decade before they
were codified into law with the passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005.150
Inasmuch as the standards set forth by the BIA in In re S-M-J- were informed
by the Board’s reading of the UNHCR Handbook,151 the important relation-
ship between U.S. ratification of the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Conven-
tion and the protection of asylum seekers in the United States is evident.
In the same way, there is an important role for international guidance in
helping to conduct rigorous statelessness determinations that arrive at the
correct result. Indeed, the Statelessness Handbook divides relevant evidence
into two categories: evidence relating to the individual’s personal circum-
stances and evidence concerning the laws and conditions in the country in
question.152 It then goes on to provide extensive lists of examples of these
types of evidence, as well as guiding considerations for assessing the
reliability of evidence.153 These insights could be of particular use to U.S.
adjudicators, who have substantial experience examining the personal circum-
stances of non-citizens applying for immigration relief but are not well
prepared for complex nationality determinations. As discussed in the previ-
ous section, making nationality determinations has been a challenge for U.S.
146. Id. at 727.
147. In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 729 (B.I.A. 1997).
148. Id. at 727, 729-30.
149. Id.
150. See Deborah Anker, et al., Any Real Change? Credibility and Corroboration after the REAL
ID Act, in IMMIGR. & NATIONALITY L. HANDBOOK 357 (2008) (arguing that despite widespread
concern that the standards set forth in the REAL ID Act created more stringent standards for
credibility and corroboration, they were in fact consistent with In re S-M-J-).
151. See In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 725.
152. STATELESSNESS HANDBOOK, supra note 93, at 32.
153. Id. at 32-33.
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courts in the asylum context,154 and international guidance on this point
would be illuminating.
The Statelessness Handbook also emphasizes that non-cooperation or
actions to deliberately withhold information from adjudicating authorities are
reasonable bases to find that an applicant has not met the standard of proof
unless evidence clearly indicates that the person is stateless.155 Balanced
advice of this nature is the product of expert input and substantial experience
with nationality law research and statelessness determinations. Such guid-
ance will be essential to ensure that those who are intended to receive
protection as stateless persons are properly found to be stateless, while those
who legitimately are not stateless can be appropriately documented for
removal.
The questions relating to standards of proof and evidence taken up by the
U.S. Supreme Court and the BIA in Cardoza-Fonseca and In re S-M-J-
respectively will almost certainly come up in the statelessness determination
context. Notably, in both of the cases, the notion of international protection
and the guidance of international refugee law was important in order to set
the scope of humanitarian assistance in a way that resonates with the global
consensus on protection. The potential for high standards of proof and
evidence, coupled with additional statutory restrictions and exceptions that
also fail to comport with international standards for protection, create a risk
that statelessness protection in the United States will simply reach too few
people to have the intended impact.
2. Numerous Exclusions from Protection will Further Limit the Path Out
of the Stateless Legal Limbo
The remaining sections of the proposed protection mechanism, provisions
(C) through (E), relate to grounds on which stateless persons can be denied
protection under the U.S. mechanism. Section (C) excludes from stateless-
ness protection all persons who became stateless because of voluntary action
or knowing inaction.156 As an initial matter, it is unsurprising that the
proposed mechanism would deny protection to stateless persons who volun-
tarily renounce their nationality in order to become stateless. If there were no
such exception, nothing would stop any person intent upon immigrating to
the United States from traveling to a port of entry and renouncing their
citizenship in order to pursue protection as a stateless person.157 Moreover,
154. See Zahren v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 2007); Urgen v. Holder, 768 F.3d 269 (2d
Cir. 2014).
155. STATELESSNESS HANDBOOK, supra note 93, at 35.
156. See S. 744 § 3405 (proposed INA § 210A(b)(1)(c)).
157. The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does include a prohibition on
voluntary renunciation of nationality that requires states party to the Convention to prohibit under
their nationality laws the renunciation of nationality that would leave a person stateless. Neverthe-
less, many countries, including the United States, do not prevent such renunciation under their laws.
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the Statelessness Handbook provides that an individual’s free choice may
affect the status accorded once a statelessness determination has been made,
and a denial of protection to those who voluntarily renounce their nationality
or otherwise refuse to reacquire a nationality may be appropriate.158 In this
regard, SB 744 likely complies with international law inasmuch as a person
who voluntarily renounces his nationality will likely still be considered
stateless under the proposed framework159 but will be ineligible for protec-
tion under exception (C).
One concern is that the term “voluntary action” clearly encompasses more
than voluntary renunciation, and the term “knowing inaction” encompasses a
host of negative actions that will be open to interpretation by adjudicators.
Broad interpretations of these exceptions could swallow the rule. As an
example, there are stateless persons in the United States who were citizens of
the former Soviet Union, and who failed to return to post-Soviet successor
states and became stateless because they did not meet residency requirements
under newly promulgated nationality laws. Questions about whether this
constitutes “knowing inaction” that results in statelessness could certainly
arise and interpretations among immigration judges could vary. In fact, in
any statelessness determination, there will often be moments when an
individual could have taken a different course of action that may have led to a
grant of citizenship under the operation of laws of some country. However,
the Handbook does not support an interpretation under which a reasoned
failure to act would result in a limitation on protection,160 and it would be
helpful to have this interpretive guide when U.S. adjudicators consider
different scenarios under exception (C).
The other exceptions to stateless protection set forth in sections (D) and
(E), such as criminal grounds for inadmissibility,161 including national
security grounds,162 and the persecutor bar,163 are fairly expansive,164 particu-
larly when compared with the 1954 Statelessness Convention. Specifically,
the Statelessness Convention excludes from protection persons who have: (a)
158. STATELESSNESS HANDBOOK, supra note 93, at 55-56.
159. Id. at 10, 21.
160. See generally STATELESSNESS HANDBOOK, supra note 93, ¶¶ 55-56.
161. The proposal excludes from statelessness protection all applicants who are inadmissible
under INA § 212(a), with certain limited exceptions. See S. 744 § 3405 (proposed INA § 210A(b)(1)(D),
(b)(2)-(b)(3)).
162. Specifically those included in the unwaivable section 212(a)(3), titled “Security and related
grounds.” See id.
163. Specifically described in INA § 241(b)(3)(B)(i). See S. 744 § 3405 (proposed INA
§ 210A(b)(1)(E)).
164. Interestingly, the 2010 version of the RPA also included a variety of exceptions from
stateless person protection, but in that version of the bill all grounds expect persecution of others
were waivable by the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security. See Comprehensive
Immigration Reform Act of 2010. S. 3932, 111th Cong. § 257 (proposed INA § 210A(b)(2)). In the
2011 version, certain criminal and security grounds for exclusion from relief were made unwaivable,
and this persists in the most recent version of the protection mechanism proposed in SB 744. See
Refugee Protection Act of 2011, S. 1202, 112th Congress § 17 (referring to INA § 212(a)(2)(C),
(3)(A)-(C), or (E)).
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committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity;
(b) committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of their
residence prior to their admission to that country; or (c) been guilty of acts
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.165 In principle,
any exclusion to statelessness protection that is legislated in the United States
that is not listed in the Statelessness Convention would be inconsistent with
the international law of statelessness. However, there is limited international
guidance on how these exclusions should be applied, and the Statelessness
Handbook itself fails to elaborate them.166
As an initial matter, it is uncontroversial to suggest that the United States
has the authority under international law to exclude persons who pose a
threat to pubic order, even where international protection concerns are
implicated.167 At the same time, however, international law does require
individualized consideration of claims for international protection.168 Con-
cerns in this regard have been raised with respect to the 1996 Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA), which
vastly expanded the grounds for crime and national security exceptions to
asylum eligibility.169 IIRAIRA disqualified all non-citizens who had been
convicted of an “aggravated felony” from eligibility for asylum, and when
such crime receives a sentence of five years or more, the perpetrator also
becomes ineligible for the mandatory form of relief withholding of re-
moval.170 These provisions have been criticized as being non-compliant with
international refugee law,171 and as such, blanket crime-based grounds for
exclusion from statelessness protection are at least suspect.
Another potential concern about the availability of statelessness protection
relates to the national security exceptions. IIRAIRA’s mandatory denial of
asylum and withholding of removal where an applicant is found to have
engaged in an expansive category of “material support” for terrorist activity
has been criticized as overbroad.172 International law requires that such cases
are evaluated on a case-by-case basis,173 and advocacy groups such as
Human Rights First have urged U.S. immigration authorities to reasonably
165. Statelessness Convention, supra note 15, at art I(2)(iii).
166. See generally STATELESSNESS HANDBOOK, supra note 93.
167. See Jaya Ramji, Legislating Away International Law: The Refugee Provisions of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 117, 146 (2001)
(discussing the undeniable right of the U.S. government to exclude refugees who pose a threat to the
public order).
168. Id.; see also Bobbie Marie Guerra, A Tortured Construction: The Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act’s Express Bar Denying Criminal Aliens Withholding of
Deportation Defies the Principles of International Law, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 941, 975-78 (1997).
169. See Ramji, supra note 167, at 146-48.
170. INA § 241(b)(3)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3)(B).
171. See Ramji, supra note 167, at 146-47; Guerra, supra note 168, at 975-78.
172. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).
173. See Ramji, supra note 167, at 147-48.
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define the parameters of what may be considered “material support.”174
Nevertheless, the BIA rejected reasoning along these lines advanced by the
UNHCR “that there must be a link between the provision of material support
to a terrorist organization and the intended use by that recipient organization
of the assistance to further a terrorist activity.”175 Efforts to establish a duress
exception to the material support bar have similarly failed,176 exacerbating
concerns about the conflict between this exception and norms of international
protection.
Just as the number of stateless persons is unknown, it not possible to know
how many of them would be ineligible for the proposed protection scheme
because of crimes they committed or “material support” they provided to
organizations listed as terrorists. Considering how well engrained these
particular limitations are in our system of immigration regulation and
enforcement, it may be unrealistic to suggest that they should be modified to
conform with international law in the case of statelessness protection, where
such arguments have failed in the refugee context. Nevertheless, it is
important to note that these limitations exist and that they will almost
certainly operate to further limit the number of stateless persons who will be
able to escape the legal limbo to which stateless persons are currently
condemned.
More significantly, when all of these exceptions to relief are considered in
conjunction with the potential for restrictive interpretations of standards of
proof and evidence that would limit the scope of relief, the potential for relief
appears quite limited. A statelessness protection mechanism must protect
stateless persons and close the legal loophole that drives removal efforts
against internationally protected people who cannot be removed. There is a
dire need for protection of stateless persons in the United States, who are
trapped in a legal limbo and suffering in a way that is not adequately
appreciated. As the United States moves to address the problem of stateless-
ness and remedy the situation of this discrete population, it must act with
precision and in a manner informed by the global experience with this
174. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ABANDONING THE PERSECUTED: VICTIMS OF TERRORISM AND
OPPRESSION BARRED FROM ASYLUM 11-12 (2006), available at https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/06925-asy-abandon-persecuted.pdf.
175. See In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 944 (B.I.A. 2006).
176. See, e.g., Barahona v. Holder, 691 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2012). But see USCIS, FACT SHEET
CONCERNING THE SECRETARY’S EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY UNDER SEC. 212(d)(3)(B)(i) (2007), available
at http://www.rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/Tier%20I%20and%20Tier%20II%20Duress%20Waiver%20F
act%20Sheet%205-10-07.pdf (DHS in 2007 gave blanket authority to waive, in the exercise of
discretion, the bar for those who give material support to Tier Three organizations under duress.);
USCIS, POLICY MEMORANDUM RE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DISCRETIONARY EXEMPTION AUTHORITY
UNDER SECTION 212(D)(3)(B)(I) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT FOR THE PROVISION OF
CERTAIN LIMITED MATERIAL SUPPORT (2015), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/
nativedocuments/2015-0508_Certain_Limited_Material_Support_PM_Effective.pdf (DHS ex-
panded the waiver remedy in 2014, by covering those who give “limited” support under “substantial
pressure” that does not rise to the level of duress).
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internationally protected population. Only then will the United States suc-
ceed in resolving the legal limbo in which stateless persons languish.
IV. CONCLUSION
As this article goes to print, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees is
ramping up its ten-year, #IBELONG campaign to eradicate statelessness by
2024. The campaign’s message is that statelessness is a problem of global
proportions and that the entire international community needs to work to
ensure that citizens of nowhere find safe harbor. As long as statelessness
persists in the world, migrants in the United States risk becoming stateless
and trapped in legal limbo within U.S. borders. The United States has made
an important international pledge to do its part to end statelessness by
establishing a stateless person protection mechanism under the Immigration
and Nationality Act. In pursuit of this goal, the U.S. Senate proposed such a
mechanism as part of the SB 744 comprehensive immigration reform effort.
Stateless persons in the United States need this legislative project to come to
fruition, but it will only provide an effective solution to their quandary if it is
designed in harmony with the international system for protection.
The stateless population in the United States is discrete, but their suffering
is intense. The little that is known about these individuals also reveals that
their pasts are complicated, and a serious analysis of their factual accounts
and complex legal histories will require both precision and compassion in
order to arrive at the correct result. The Statelessness Convention and the
recently released Statelessness Handbook provide the most reliable tools to
ensure a systematic, protection-oriented approach to statelessness determina-
tion. Just as the Refugee Convention and Handbook have provided U.S.
adjudicators with essential guidance in the effort to define substantive law
and procedure for asylum seekers in the United States, international guidance
will be crucial for statelessness protection.
Without the guidance of the international protection framework, there is a
danger that restrictive interpretations, high standards of proof, and broad
application of exceptions could prevail. The practical result of this in the
context of a statelessness determination and protection mechanism will be to
limit relief to stateless persons, and their legal limbo will persist. This is an
important aspect to the statelessness problem in the United States, in which
stateless individuals denied relief could continue to receive removal orders
and loop into the default mandatory detention and immigration parole
scheme already in place. There is no hope of removing these lost souls, and
the system of detention and removal is unduly burdened by this humanitarian
quandary. The most effective way to identify stateless persons in the United
States and provide them with protection is to implement a mechanism in
harmony with the guidance from the international community, developed in
response to the global statelessness crisis.
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